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Could globalization—specifically, increased international trade and openness to foreign 
investment—increase inequality in developing countries? Empirical studies in many such 
economies show that expanding trade and FDI are associated with higher inequality in 
wages and regional incomes.  However, there is no agreement regarding the cause of such 
increases.  We present a theoretical model showing how interactions between factor 
mobility restrictions and different rates of technical progress (due to trade and FDI) in a 
regionally heterogeneous economy can explain the evolution of inequality.  As favored 
regions benefit more from trade, their growing demand for skills drains skilled workers 
from disadvantaged areas, and average incomes in favored regions grow faster than in 
less favored regions.  Moreover, this unbalanced regional growth may be the source of 
rising inequality within each region, and even of falling per capita incomes in the less 
favored region.  We test our predictions with data from China’s coastal and inland 
provinces.  The results confirm that different regional growth rates have increased both 
interregional and intraregional inequality.  In addition, growth of skills-based export 
industries in coastal regions, other things equal, is associated with lower incomes for the 
poor in inland provinces. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
Does foreign trade increase inequality in developing countries? Empirical studies in many 
developing countries show that expanding trade is associated with higher inequality in wages and 
in regional incomes, but there is no agreement regarding the cause of such increases. Factors 
acknowledged to affect economic inequality include innate ability, education, race, gender, 
initial wealth, labor markets, government policy and development patterns. Through one or more 
of these factors, opening national economies to international trade may have a significant impact 
on inequality. 
Classical trade theory provides a convenient starting point. The usual belief is that richer 
countries are relatively abundant in skilled labor, while low-income countries are endowed with 
relatively more unskilled labor.  According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, low-income countries 
should specialize in the production of less skill-intensive products (for example textiles and 
footwear), while their wealthier trading partners specialize in skill-intensive products (for 
example machinery).  A direct implication of this model is that greater openness to trade in a 
low-income economy will lower the relative price of the skilled labor-intensive imported good, 
and along with it the skill premium (the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages).  Because the model 
assumes that factors of production can move across sectors, changes in prices affect factor 
returns economy-wide.  Thus, classical theory predicts that trade liberalization should cause 
reductions in poverty and inequality in low-income countries. 
However, empirical studies have typically failed to find evidence of such shifts. With 
greater trade openness, wage inequality has been observed to increase in most developed 
countries and to decline in some developing countries; however, with greater trade openness 
some developing countries have also experienced an increase in the skill premium (Hanson and 
Harrison 1995, Robbins 1996, Wood 1997, and Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004). These results 
challenge economists to explain both the widening wage gap in developed countries and the 
mixed effects on skill premium in developing countries. 
At the same time, inequality is rarely unidimensional, and inter-regional inequality is 
sometimes more severe than intra-regional inequality.  Abstracting from trade, neoclassical 
growth theory predicts faster growth of poor economies compared to rich economies, other 
things equal, due to the diminishing marginal productivity of capital (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
2004).  An extrapolation from Heckscher-Ohlin also predicts declining regional inequality as a      2
country improves access to international trade, so long as capital and labor are mobile across 
regional boundaries. 
Empirical studies show clearly that the benefits of trade openness don't always spread 
uniformly throughout a country.  Data from the EU shows that intra-national inequalities have 
increased as a consequence of European integration, even though international inequality has 
declined (Esteban 1994; Puga 2002).  Among developing countries, studies of Mexico and China 
show that isolated regions tend to lag behind areas better positioned for trade (Hanson 2004; 
Hale and Long 2008; Candelaria et al. 2009).  These findings suggest that international trade 
may affect countries in complex ways. 
Understanding the links between trade and inequality is important in low-income 
countries. Trade openness may generate growth through many channels (such as increased 
specialization, economies of scale, technology transfer, improved competitiveness and increased 
availability of capital), but if it is accompanied by sufficiently large rises in inequality, then 
growth alone may not be sufficient to reduce poverty in all segments of the population. 
Trade liberalization can affect the welfare of the poor by changing the prices of tradable 
goods and improving access to new products; by changing the relative wages of skilled and 
unskilled labor, therefore affecting the employment and income of the poor; by reducing 
government revenue from tariffs and therefore lowering its ability to finance programs helping 
the poor; and/or by making the economy more vulnerable to negative external shocks.  Rigidities 
in the labor market can also make it difficult for the poor to move into other occupations or 
locations to take full advantage of the benefits brought by trade openness, or to minimize its 
negative impacts.  Understanding through which channel trade affects inequality helps us not 
only to figure out who wins and who loses when an economy globalizes, but also how to design 
policy to mitigate the costs borne by the poor. 
This paper models links between trade and inequality in developing countries and tests its 
implications using province-level data from China.  Our model has two countries, North and 
South.  South is composed of two regions, Coast and Inland; thus we have three regional 
economies.  These are heterogeneous both in their skilled and unskilled labor endowments and in 
production technology. There is a continuum of goods differentiated by skill-intensity. For each 
good, production takes place in the region that is most efficient at producing it, and the rest of the 
world imports this good from that region.
iii  Given each region's endowment and technology      3
level, the developed country (North) produces the most skill-intensive goods; intermediate skill-
intensive goods production takes place in the relatively skill-intensive and relatively high 
technology region in the South (Coast), while the skill-scarce Southern region (Inland), with the 
lowest technology level, supplies unskilled labor-intensive goods. The Coast’s catch-up in 
technology with North shifts less skill-intensive production from North to South and therefore 
demands more skilled than unskilled labor in the Coast region. This process leads firms in this 
region to offer skilled labor a higher skill premium.  On the other hand, Inland may experience 
slower or no technological progress and therefore may lose its most skill-intensive operations to 
the Coast.  If labor is not mobile between regions of the South, Inland may thus experience a 
falling skill premium.  Less obviously, when skilled labor can move freely within the South but 
unskilled labor cannot, different rates of technological progress between the Southern regions 
may induce even more dramatic changes in the spatial distribution of economic activity, and in 
inequality both within and between regions. The empirical part of this paper uses Chinese data to 
test these predictions of the impact of trade on inequality both within and between regions. 
The theoretical model is an extension of one by Zhu and Trefler (2005).  Our model is 
special in a number of ways. First, we add heterogeneity into the developing economy. Second, 
we investigate the effect of labor market segmentation on both wage disparities and spatial 
inequality. Our model differs from the literature studying the relationship between foreign trade 
and regional inequality in three important ways.  First, we assume countries don't share the same 
technology.  Second, different regions within a country may have different skill intensities in 
their labor endowments.  Third, we are able to study both wage inequality and regional income 
inequality.  To the best of our knowledge, these features mark this paper as the first to study the 
relationship between trade and multidimensional inequality in a developing country. 
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows: In section 2 we present some 
background for studying inequality. In section 3 we develop our analytical model and link our 
theoretical predictions to empirical work. In section 4 we describe data, model specification and 
empirical results. In section 5, we draw conclusions. 
      4
2   BACKGROUND 
With rapidly growing foreign trade, China has had the fastest economic growth of any nation in 
the past three decades: fast enough to reduce poverty, by the World Bank’s $1.25/day measure, 
from 835m to 208m between 1981 and 2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008).  However, China has 
also experienced one of the largest increases in inequality during this period (World Bank, 2005).  
Knight and Song (2003) find that from 1988 to 1995 the Gini coefficient of earnings in China 
rose by eight percentage points.  The mean wage increased by 52 percent, but wage of the 10th 
percentile rose by only 6% while that of the 90th percentile rose by 75%.  More recently, Wang 
and Shi (2006) use 1981-2002 data to show that income inequality in urban China has increased 
significantly since the early 1980s, and especially since the early 1990s.  Using urban wage data 
in six provinces, Parker et al. (2003) show that the wages of the median worker with at least 
some college education grew by 6.3 percent from 1988 to 1999, 1.6 percentage points higher 
than those of the median junior high school graduate.  They also find that technicians gained 
more relative to manual workers, and that inequality increased significantly within each 
occupation group.  These trends are a reminder that rapid growth does not guarantee that the 
gains be equally distributed, and if the benefits from trade accrue disproportionately to high-
income groups or regions, the trickle-down effect of growth on poverty reduction may be slow 
(Bhanumurthy and Mitra 2004).   
Regional incomes in China have also diverged significantly, and in particular, the 
widening gap between coastal and interior provinces has been very prominent in explanations of 
trends in overall inequality during the open door era (e.g., Jian et al 1996).  The difference in 
growth rates between coastal and inland regions has been as high as three percent during the past 
two decades (Zhang and Zhang, 2003).  Rural incomes are generally higher in the relatively 
developed east.  Most provinces in central China have per capita rural incomes close to the 
national average. All those with per capita income below 2,000 yuan are located in the west 
(Wan and Zhou 2004). Park et al. (2003) find that wage growth in Guangdong province is greater 
than in other province at every percentile; Zhejiang is the second fastest, followed by Beijing. 
All three are coastal provinces. On the other hand, the median growth rate of real wages in 
Shaanxi, the slowest-growing province, was 3.7%—nearly 6 percentage points lower than 
Guangdong.  It seems that China is now on a dual track, with a prosperous and fast-growing 
coastal region, and a poor interior growing at a considerably lower rate.       5
Why do spatial disparities arise?  As China’s economy integrates with global markets, the 
comparative advantage of its regions needs to be evaluated in a global context.  Coastal regions 
enjoy a comparative advantage in proximity to the international market and in access to a large 
pool of well-educated labor. As a result, coastal provinces have attracted far more foreign direct 
investment and generated more trade volume than have inland provinces.  In 2000, three coastal 
provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shanghai) contributed more than 60 percent of total foreign 
trade, while three inland provinces (Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, and Jilin), were the worst 
performers in terms of attracting FDI.  Together with institutional barriers to internal labor 
mobility, these differences lead to different regional paces of globalization, despite a uniform 
national policy of opening to trade.
iv  
Different initial conditions also influence trends in regional inequality. For instance, 
faster growth in richer regions may diminish growth prospects in poorer regions by attracting 
capital and skilled labor.  From a poverty reduction point of view, it is important to understand 
this pattern in China, as despite its success in economic growth, it still accounts for some 15% of 
the world’s poor, and those poor are located mainly in slower-growing areas. 
Despite the theoretical and practical importance of the subject, to our knowledge there is 
still no study dealing with the question of how trade simultaneously affects both wages and 
regional inequality. Some New Economic Geography theorists, relying heavily on a Dixit-
Stigliz-Krugman or Ottaviano type of monopolistic competition, study the impact of falling 
international trade costs and national transport costs on development and disparity in economies 
involved in an integration process (Fujita et al. 1999; Krugman and Venables 1995; Montfort and 
Nicolini 2000; Paluzie 2001; Monfort and van Ypersele 2003; Behrens et al. 2003).  IN these 
studies each country is composed of two regions; labor is mobile between these but not 
internationally.  Goods can be traded both nationally and internationally, though not costlessly.  
Some regions within a country may benefit from their initial conditions. For instance, having an 
advantage in geographic location for international trade, the coast becomes the initial location for 
industrial agglomeration, so people from the inland are mainly involved in agriculture while 
coastal workers participate in manufacturing. The coast's leadership in manufacturing is 
reinforced by increasing returns to scale, which implies a potential linkage between foreign trade 
and regional inequality.  Models of this kind show that lower internal transport costs foster 
regional divergence when international trade costs are high enough, whereas lower international      6
trade costs promote regional convergence when domestic transport costs are high enough. 
However, several characteristics of these models make them inappropriate for studying our 
problem. All abstract from comparative advantage of either the Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin 
type, by assuming that each region has equal access to the same technology and has identical 
labor endowments. These assumptions are arguably appropriate for explaining integration 
between similar countries, such as member states of the EU, but are unsuitable for explaining 
North-South inequality or that within a relatively heterogeneous economy such as China.  
The model we use builds upon Zhu and Trefler (2005) (hereafter ZT). Inspired by 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) (hereafter FH), they develop a model in which skilled and unskilled 
labor are inputs in production of a continuum of goods. Both technology and endowment 
differences determine that North produces and exports high skill intensive goods, while South 
exports low skill-intensive goods. Southern technology catch-up induces North to transfer 
production of its least skill-intensive goods to the South. This product relocation raises the 
relative demand for skilled workers, and thus wage inequality, within both regions. 
Although both FH and ZT go beyond the limitations of Heckscher-Ohlin, two aspects 
relevant to our work are still underrepresented.  First, the North-South framework cannot 
encompass different sub-national responses of the skill premium and of economic structure to 
trade openness; therefore, it makes no prediction about regional inequality within the South 
economy.  Second, a meaningful exploration of trade-wage linkages within developing countries 
requires a clear understanding and treatment both of general equilibrium mechanisms and of the 
operation of the labor market, neither of which are trivial problems in such countries. 
Our goal in this paper is to model mechanisms linking trade and technology to wages and 
economic structure in different regions of the South, both in general terms and also in the 
presence of labor-market frictions.  In section 3, we extend the ZT model to the case of two 
countries incorporating three regions. Countries and regions are distinguished by differences in 
factor endowments and technology (rather than by shipping costs, which are emphasized in the 
new economic geography models).  By adding features absent from the ZT framework, our 
model allows for regional differences in both factor endowments and productivity growth within 
the developing country.  These differences can lead to asymmetric responses of economic 
structure and inequality to a trade shock. We are also able to study the influence of factor market 
segmentation on this process.       7
3    MODEL 
Model setup 
There are two factors of production, unskilled labor (L) and skilled labor (H).  These are used to 
produce a continuum of goods indexed by z, with larger z representing greater skill intensity.  
Production functions are neoclassical, displaying strict quasi-concavity, constant returns to scale, 
and continuous derivatives. There are no factor intensity reversals.  Goods markets are perfectly 
competitive, and thus in equilibrium profit is zero. 
We assume that production takes place in two countries, North (N), a skilled-labor-
abundant country, and South (S), a skilled-labor-scarce country.  Within South there are two 
regions: a skilled-labor-scarce Inland and a skilled-labor-abundant Coast.  We have thus assumed 
that labor markets are integrated in North but not in South.  Internal labor mobility in developing 
countries is subject to many more restrictions compared to interstate mobility in the U.S. or other 
developed countries.  In China specifically, evidence suggests that substantial barriers to labor 
mobility persist in spite of three decades of economic reforms. These barriers include legal 
impediments based on the hukou (household registration certificate) system as well as less 
formal discrimination against migrants (especially unskilled workers) from inland provinces. 
These restrictions have a noticeable effect on rates of migration. For the five-year period 
1985-1990, the rate of interstate migration in the U.S. was 9%, while the corresponding rate in 
China was only 1%.  For 1995-2000 these rates were 8% in the U.S. and 3% in China (National 
Bureau of Statistics 2002, pp.1813-1817; U.S. Census Bureau 2003), despite far higher rates of 
economic growth and structural change in China.  In our benchmark model we stylize this 
difference by assuming no labor movement between inland and coastal regions of the South 
economy.  This assumption will subsequently be relaxed to permit certain types of labor to move.   
Another reason to assume a heterogeneous South economy is that for many developing 
countries, regional disparities seem to be growing.  At the onset of the economic reform period, 
average earnings in China’s western regions were even higher than those in coastal regions. For 
instance, in 1978, the average wage was 696 yuan in the eight western provinces
v and 666 yuan 
in the eight coastal provinces
vi (National Bureau of Statistics 1999: 139).  By the end of the 
1980s, however, average earnings in the coastal region had risen much faster, and have been 
higher than in the west ever since.  Even within in urban areas, earnings growth has diverged      8
across provinces (Knight et al. 2001).  A sizeable part of the observed earnings gap can be 
attributed to faster economic growth and greater capital inflows to the coastal region on one hand, 
and on the other hand, to limited labor mobility between regions.  For instance, from 1995 to 
2002 average earnings per worker rose by 84% in Beijing and 79% in Guangdong, but only by 
3% in Gansu and 27% in Yunnan (Knight et al. 2006). 
Production 
Skilled and unskilled labor are the only factors of production, and  ( ) i L z and  () i H z  are the 
unskilled and skilled labor requirements for producing one unit of good z  in region i. Let  jN w  
be the wage of factor j  (j = L, H) in North, and 
k
jS w  be the wage of factor j  (j = L, H) in region 
 (Inland, Coast) in South.  Let  k / 1 NH N L N ww ω = >  be the wage of skilled labor relative to that 
of unskilled labor in North, and let  /
jjj
SH S L S ww ω 1 = > be the corresponding ratio in region j of 





S ω ωω <<                                                           (1) 
Furthermore, we assume that 
  
IC C I
HSH SH NL NL SL wwwwww ≥>>>≥ S                        (2) 
There is a continuum of sectors in the economy. Given goods prices and factor returns, the 
representative firm that produces variety z in country i and region j faces the following 
maximization problem: 
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where  is the price of variety z. Firms choose the numbers of both unskilled workers () Pz ( )
j
i L z  
and skilled workers ()
j
i H z  to employ.  Each firm incurs costs by paying wages to hired labor. 
Under constant returns to scale and assuming free entry, firms bid for workers until no firm earns 
a strictly positive profit. Therefore,  ( ) ,, , iH i L i Cw wz t , the unit cost function for producing good z  
in region i, must be equal to . Finally,  stands for total varieties available, and tdenotes 
time and captures all factors other than wage that affect unit costs—for instance technology level 
or infrastructure in each region.  Costs are thus written  
() Pz n     9
() ( ) ( ) ,, , iH i L i L i i H i i Cw wz t w Lz wHz =+ .  
Here,  () i L z and  () i H z  represent the optimal quantities of unskilled and skilled labor to produce 
one unit of variety z, given the endowments and technology available in each region.  
We assume (for simplicity) that goods can be costlessly shipped across countries and 
regions.
vii Perfect competition exists for good z produced in this region, so the zero profit 
condition implies 
   () () ( ) NL N NH N N Pz wLz wH z =+                                                      
   () () ( )
CC CC C
SL S S H S S Pz w Lz w Hz =+        ( 3 )  
   ( ) ( ) ( )
II II I
SL S S H S S Pz w Lz wHz =+  
One drawback of the H-O model is that it assumes that both countries share the same 
technology, an assumption that cannot explain technological change and the related pattern of 
trade in some industries where technological differences seem of obvious importance. The past 
several decades have seen the development of several technology-oriented theories of trade, led 
by Posner (1961), Dornbusch et al. (1977), and Krugman (1982).  International technology 
differences are allowed in our model (for succinctness, in what follows we usually drop t, 
including it only when necessary). We assume Ricardian comparative advantage, i.e. 
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for all z , where  () ( ) ( ) .,., min .,., , .,.,
CI
SS S Cz Cz Cz ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  








                    (4.b) 
for all z .  To be more specific, North is the technology leader in all production, especially in 
more skill-intensive goods. Inland lags in every field, but has comparative advantage in the least 
skill-intensive goods. Intermediate skill-intensive products can be the optimal choices for Coast. 
 
Lemma 1: Endowment-based comparative advantage (inequality 1) and Ricardian comparative 
advantage (inequality 4) together imply 
  () ( ) ,, / ,,
0
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for all ( ,,,
jj
HNL NH SL S wwww ), that is, the North has a comparative advantage in skill-intensive 
goods, and the Southern coastal region is good at intermediate skill-intensive production. 
 
Inequality 2, Lemma 1 and the zero profit conditions together imply that North produces 
and exports the most skill-intensive goods, while within South, Coast produces and exports 
intermediate skill-intensive goods, and the least skill-intensive goods are all produced in Inland. 
We define the marginal good,  ,  by  i z 1, 2 i =
() () ( ) ( ) 1
CI
22 1 , NS S S Pz Pz Pz Pz == .                    
We can think of goods produced in the North as newly developed products that require 
large amounts of skilled labor in their production and continuing development. The high wage of 
skilled labor, the lower level of technological know-how, and poor infrastructure all prevent 
skill-intensive good outsourcing to the South, especially to the Inland. Finally, as products 
mature and become standardized, the production process becomes routine and less-skilled labor 
can play a more important role. Together with technology diffusion into developing countries, 
some products can be outsourced to the South to take advantage of lower costs. 
Equilibrium 
Goods Market 
Consider an economy in which all consumers supply labor inelastically and have identical 
preferences over a continuum of differentiated consumption goods.  The utility function is 




ii Uz x z α =∫ d z  
where x(z) stands for the amount of variety z demanded by the representative consumer. 
Consumer utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint  , which is equal to the ith 
agent’s labor income, and depends on her skilled or unskilled status and also on her country or 
region of origin. The budget constraint of an unskilled worker in the North, for example, is: 
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where   is the price of variety  () Pz z . Analogous constraints exist for other types of worker.   
The utility function implies that consumers have a strong preference for variety. 
Individual demand for varietyz ,  () x z , is obtained by maximizing utility with respect to the 
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Because we assume competitive markets and zero shipping costs,  is the price faced 
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Labor market 
N H  and   are skilled- and unskilled-labor endowments in North.  ,  ,  , and   are 
skilled- and unskilled-labor endowments in Inland and Coast, respectively. The relative skills 
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where () N H z  and  () N L z  are skilled labor and unskilled labor used in production of good z  in 
North. We define North's excess demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor,  ( ) 2 Nz , by 
  ( ) () () () ()
22
2 / NN N N zz Nz xzH z H d z xzL z L d z ≡− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ∫∫ /
zz
⎤ ⎦              (7.a) 
In the same fashion,  and  () 1
I Sz ( ) 2
C Sz  are excess demands for Inland and Coast: 
                (7.b)  ( ) () () () ()
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Then we need to rewrite our relative labor demand. In Inland, consider some  [ ] 1 0, zz ∈  
from () () () ( ) /
CI I
NS S S x zz Y Y Y P α =+ +z , and zero profits, 
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where   is the optimal amount of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor for producing z, 
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Similarly, 
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In equilibrium the excess demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled should be zero: 
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In a similar fashion, for  [ ] 12 , zz z ∈ ,      13
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Trade 
Under the balanced trade assumption, we assume balanced trade between each area and the rest 
of the world, so we have 
() () () ( )
2
2 0 () /
zz CI
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d z
 is demand by the rest of the world for goods produced in North, 
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and when both these equalities hold, trade is automatically balanced for Coast, by Walras’ Law. 
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The equilibrium can be fully represented by ( ) 12 ,,, ,
CI
NS S zz ωωω , by solving both labor-market 
and trade-clearing conditions (see Dornbusch et al. 1980; Zhu and Trefler 2005). 
Technological change 
As discussed above, the technology level is a determinant of the structure of a region's economy. 
The restructuring of economies may be associated with different speeds of technological change. 
The study of the impact of technology and technological change has a long tradition in 
the economic analysis of trade and welfare (for an overview see Dixit and Norman, 1980). While 
these contributions mainly address effects on trade and utility, they seldom discuss effects on 
relative factor prices, which are the main focus of this paper.  In the spirit of modeling Southern 
technology catch-up, we define it as either technology spillover from developed to developing 
countries, or as cost-reducing process innovations. We assume that technical change is 
exogenous and uses no real resources.  As in Vernon (1966), new products are first introduced in 
the North, with its large pool of skilled labor and its proximity to large and rich markets that 
facilitate innovation.  Once a manufacturing method becomes standardized, the South can easily 
imitate it and take advantage of its cheaper labor to begin production. 
In the age of globalization, however, barriers to the flow of technical know-how from 
technological leaders to followers have been greatly reduced. Trade in goods and factors 
provides new sources of technological progress (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer 1991).
viii  Major obstacles, such as information asymmetries and factor proportion 
differences between North and South, make Southern technology acquisition a complex process, 
and the speed of technology diffusion varies across countries and regions. Among the factors that 
facilitate technology adoption, human capital availability is well documented.
ix  Southern cost-
reducing innovation occurs as Southern labor masters technological know-how. 
We define productivity gain in the North by:      15
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and similarly, for Coast we obtain  ( ) ,
C
S zt φ  and Inland  ( ) ,
I
S zt φ .  From the definition of 
efficiency improvement, we know  ( ) .,. i φ  is always non-positive. So by definition, technological 
catch-up in South’s coastal economy is defined by  ( ) ( ) ,,
C
NS zt zt φφ 0 − > ; otherwise, we say that 
Coast lags behind North.  Similarly,  ( ) ( ) ,,
CI
SS zt zt φφ0 − <  implies that technological progress in 
Coast outpaces that in Inland. 
 
Lemma 2: As production range increases in one region, both skilled and unskilled wages in that 
region increase, for a given technology. 
 
Proposition 1: When Coast catches up with North, and when Inland has a slower rate of 
technological progress compared to that of Coast, some skill-intensive goods production 
migrates into Coast from North, and Inland loses its most skill-intensive good to Coast. Wage 
inequality in North increases, and that of Inland decreases. Wage inequality of Coast can go 
either way. 
 
Proposition 2: When Coast catches up with North, and Inland has slower technological progress 
compared to that of Coast, returns for both skilled and unskilled labor decrease in Inland, while 
both unskilled- and skilled-labor wages increase in Coast. Regional inequality also increases. 
 
Detailed proofs of Lemma 2 and these two propositions are provided in the Appendix. 
Intuitively, the sequence of changes in economic structure and inequality resulting from 
technological progress and foreign trade is as follows.  Holding all wage levels fixed, coastal 
catch-up makes this region absolutely more productive and generates positive profits for Coast 
producers. Inter-firm competition for labor then raises the relative wage of Coast workers. Rising 
income leads South to import more, which causes Coast to develop a trade deficit with North. To 
eliminate the trade imbalance, Coast must increase its supply of goods and reduce its demand for 
Northern goods. Both changes are facilitated by a rise in z2.      16
We now allow the wage level to change. A rise in z2 eliminates the trade imbalance but 
creates excess demand in the South for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor. The rising skill 
premium eliminates this excess demand in two ways. First, it leads to a within-good substitution 
away from skilled labor. Second, it increases the relative price of skill-intensive goods, and this 
leads to a between-good reallocation toward the South's least skill-intensive goods. Together, 
these two mechanisms clear Southern labor markets. 
Adjustment in North proceeds as follows: fixing the wage level, Northern income rises as 
well, but by less than that of the Coast. This leads North to import more than before but less so 
than Coast, which in turn results in a trade surplus. To eliminate this surplus, North has to reduce 
its supply of goods and increase its demand for Southern coastal products. Both changes are 
facilitated by a decrease in z2. Now allow wages to change; a rise in z2 eliminates the trade 
imbalance but creates excess demand for skilled-labor relative to unskilled-labor in North. The 
rising wage premium helps eliminate this excess demand and restore Northern labor markets. 
When there is balanced technological progress within the South, we return to the ZT 
economy. But as long as technological progress occurs at different rates in Inland and Coast, it 
creates extra effects not captured in the two-country model.  For instance, if Inland lags behind 
Coast in productivity growth, then at constant wages Inland becomes less productive relative to 
Coast. Therefore, slower income growth in Inland results in a trade surplus for this area with 
Coast. To restore trade balance requires Inland to produce less, while Coast needs to increase its 
variety of goods. This leads to a rise in z2, and a decrease in z1. 
When wages are allowed to change, slower technological progress in Inland results in a 
skill-premium reduction, while wage inequality in Coast is reduced by that region’s expansion 
into less skill-intensive production. Thus faster technological progress in Coast compared to the 
other regions has two opposing effects on its wage inequality.  Technological progress and 
expanded production raise both skilled and unskilled wages, and the relative wage outcome 
depends on which effect dominates.  In Inland, by contrast, both wage changes are indeterminate 
in sign, so technological progress and reduced production lines have opposing effects (in the 
special case of a lack of technological progress, both wages decrease).  But in any case, returns 
to both types of labor rise faster in Coast than in Inland.      17
Migration 
In this section, we relax the restriction of labor immobility by allowing skilled labor to move 
freely within the South. This asymmetry in the relative mobility of labor arises because 
empirically, there are more restrictions on unskilled labor migration, and also because there is a 
shortage of skilled labor in fast-developing regions.  Following Krugman (1991), "immobile 
labor" is usually interpreted as a proxy for all non-tradable services, amenities and factors such 
as land (Baldwin et al. 2003). This relative immobility of unskilled with respect to skilled 
workers fits well with the empirical evidence (Greenwood 1997).  Apart from "pull" factors 
behind the mobility of skilled workers, there are several "push" factors, including unfavorable 
economic conditions in the home region, and lower returns to skill compared to workers of equal 
skill outside the home region.   
Within China, most permanent migrants are skilled and educated workers such as 
professionals and university students. Their migration is facilitated by a local hukou, which in 
China serves as an internal passport system in many ways and gives them better access to not 
only jobs but also housing, education, health care, public security, and other services in the city. 
In addition to the hukou system, the "blue stamp hukou" was formally endorsed in 1992 and has 
become popular in large cities since the mid-1990s. The criteria for obtaining a blue stamp hukou 
include a large investment or home purchase, as well as age, education, and skills. Most low-
skilled or rural migrants are not eligible for and/or cannot afford this type of hukou. 
Returning to the model, we now assume free mobility of skilled labor within (but not 
beyond) the South economy.  So  , and we define
IC
SS HH H += S /
C
SS HHη ≡ , i.e., the proportion 
of skilled labor in Coast.  For its properties see appendix A.6. 
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and in Inland,       18
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Also, the labor market clearing condition in the Southern economy becomes 
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And with all else constant, 
I
S ω  is decreasing in 1 η − . Thus Inland wage inequality is a 
decreasing function of the number of skilled workers in that region. 
The relative demand for skilled labor in Inland is:
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Proposition 3: As Coast catches up with North, and Inland has a lower rate of technological 
progress relative to Coast, some skill-intensive production migrates into Coast from North, and 
Inland loses its most skill-intensive goods to the Coast. Wage inequality rises in both North and 
Inland, while that in Coast can go either way. 
 
Proposition 4: When Inland has slower technological progress relative to Coast, wages for 
unskilled labor in Coast increase more than those of Inland. Wages for skilled labor in the South 
increase, and regional inequality also increases. 
  
Detailed proofs of these two propositions are provided in the Appendix. 
Let's use two steps to understand Propositions 3 and 4. First, holding endowment constant, 
the situation is exactly the same as in Proposition 1, i.e., Coast extends its production range,      19
while that for Inland shrinks. Wage inequality in Inland decreases, and that for Coast may 
increase or decrease, but we know for certain that  .                      /
IC
SS dd t dd ωω > / t
Second, skilled labor moves into Coast. The rising skill premium attracts Inland skilled 
labor to Coast and moves the relative supply of skilled labor outward, thereby reducing relative 
wages in Coast. The net effect is ambiguous. In Inland, the relative demand for skilled labor 
decreases, and so does the relative wage.  Outflows of skilled labor boost the skill premium in 
this region until skilled wages equalize in both Coast and Inland. So the skill premium rises in 
both Coast and Inland.  
The analysis thus far has abstracted from the consequences of factor mobility on changes 
in economic structure. The inflow of skilled labor helps Coast to expand production at the 
expense of both Inland and North. In turn, the demand for both types of labor decreases in Inland, 
while the demand for labor in Coast increases even further. This second-round effect of labor 
mobility causes both skilled and unskilled wages to fall in Inland and to rise in Coast. In 
equilibrium, we know that inequality in Inland must be higher than that of Coast, and unskilled 
laborers in Inland certainly earn less than those in Coast.  
  
4    EMPIRICS 
In this section we test the foregoing analytical predictions using data from China. Given the 
strong assumption of immobility of both types of labor in propositions 1 and 2, we test only 
propositions 3 and 4, i.e., that a higher rate of technological progress in a region in the 
developing country will result in both more skill-intensity of exports and a higher skill premium, 
and that a faster rate of technological progress in one region may lead more inequality in a less 
developed region, and have adverse effects on unskilled labor returns in the lagging region.  
Several features of China make it relevant for our purpose. First, China is a very large country, 
covering 6m square miles and containing 31 administrative divisions, whose geographic features, 
technology levels and labor endowments differ greatly.  Second, as mentioned, there is restricted 
labor mobility, especially for those with low or no education.  Third, after opening to trade, 
different regions have had different access to FDI and the bundle of productivity-enhancing 
technologies and networks with which it is typically associated.   
Labor i with skill level si working in province j earns wage 
j
i ω :      20
  ( )
jj
ii ms ω =  
in which   is a provincial mapping function that maps labor skill into return of labor. This 
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unit cost reduction. 
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Data and estimation method 
The database used in our analysis covers 29 provinces
xii over 1993–2005, allowing us to use 
panel econometric tools to analyze the questions that interest us. Given the small size of our 
sample, it is preferable to use annual data, so as to take into account as much as possible of the 
information available. However, these data may contain short-term fluctuations that may not 
reflect the long-term trend. 
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respectively) in province i and year t. Then intra-provincial wage inequality in province i is 
defined as  , and interprovincial inequality at time t between provinces i and j can 
be represented by  , as suggested by the analytical model. Unfortunately, wage data by 








 xiii  However there is one issue with using the Gini as a proxy for the skill 
premium: there is a nonlinear relationship between these two variables, and sometimes the 
relationship can be non-monotonic.
xiv
The data have other limitations that should be kept in mind.  First, the NBS urban survey 
is restricted to households that have urban residence permits, and so does not include migrants      21
working illegally in cities. The survey also excludes workers residing in rural areas who are 
engaged in wage employment.  However, since most wage employment is in urban areas and 
most wage-workers are urban residents, the data should nonetheless capture major changes in 
wage inequality.  Second, working hours are not reported, which precludes the possibility of 
constructing hourly wage rates.  Third, we must treat different workers from the same household 
as if they had the same skill level. 
For comparison of interprovincial wages we use the average wage in manufacturing for 
each province. We believe that a province with a higher average manufacturing wage has higher 
returns to both unskilled and skilled labor. However there are some problems associated with 
using the average manufacturing wage to represent either skilled or unskilled labor wage: the 
skill composition of the labor force in some regions may vary, due to the relative immobility of 
unskilled labor. For example, when coastal provinces experience faster technological progress 
than inland provinces, not only do unskilled wages in inland provinces decrease, but these 
regions also become more skill-scarce.  As a result, our estimated effect of growth in coastal 
provinces on average income in the inland can be biased upward —albeit with the correct sign. 
Annual data on the quintile distribution of disposable income and average manufacturing 
wages come from the Statistical Yearbook of each province (1995-2005). Thus we have two 
equations to estimate: 
  ( )
1
12 3 ln ln ln / ln jtj t j t j t Gz H L ββ β =+ + j t X                            (8.a) 
             ( )
2
12 3 ln ln ln / ln jtj t j t j t Wz H L γγ γ =+ + j t X                             (8.b) 
where  / jtj HL t  is relative skill stock, the ratio of total skilled workers over unskilled workers at 
time t from province j. 
.
jt X  represents all other variables we should take into account. Following 
Barro and Lee (2000), we define skilled workers as those who completed at least college 
education and unskilled workers as all others. Data on the educational attainment composition of 
employment by region is from the China Labor Statistical Yearbook (1998-2005). We expect  1 β , 
2 β ,  1 γ and  2 γ  to be positive. 
On the other hand,  jt z  itself is also function of technology level and other variables, such 
as foreign investment inflow: 
 
3
12 ln ln ln jtj t zP λλ =+ j t X                                                         (9)      22
where  jt P  is technology level of province j at time t, and is calculated by dividing total value 
added by total employment (China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 1994-2006). 
3
jt X  
includes FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, and arable land per capita.  The former variable 
represents technology spillover from advanced countries, while the latter can be used to control 
for natural resources.  Natural resource abundance in a region makes it cheap to produce 
agricultural and other primary products; therefore, its skill intensity of exports should be low, 
other things equal.  In regressions we lag FDI once, to allow for delays between the installation 
of new capital and its impact on production and exports.  This also resolves a potential 
endogeneity problem.  Data for these two variables are from provincial Statistical Yearbooks. 
Provincial commodity export data are also from provincial Statistical Yearbooks (1993-
2005), and the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (1992-2006).
xv  At 
this highly aggregated level (2-digit Harmonized System), there is no clear-cut  jt z  above which 
there a province supplies no exports. Instead, we use the skill-intensity of exports as a proxy.  
Because an increase in z shifts the economy's export share towards more skill-intensive goods, 
.  To compute skill-intensity, we use 1992 data on the education level of 
employees to classify all industries into 4 categories by skill intensity. Then the corresponding 
export products are classified into four groups. Table 1 reports a breakdown of China's exports 
into high, medium-high skill, medium-low, and low skill products. For each province, the skill 
intensity of its exports in a given year is defined as the value of high skill exports divided by the 
total value of all exports of that province.  Table 2 gives summary statistics of this and other 
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Previous research has revealed that the presence of a unit root in panel data can 
dramatically affect the asymptotic properties of regression estimates and test statistics (Levin and 
Lin 1992; Im et al. 2003; Levin et al. 2002; Maddala and Wu 1999).  This problem may apply to 
our data.
xvi  So before going to estimation, we perform the Levin-Lin-Chu panel data unit root 
test on our dependent variable.  Table 3 shows the unit root test results for the average 
manufacturing wage and for the bottom 20% of income.  The test rejects the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity for both variables when a first order lag is allowed.  When no lag is included, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average manufacturing wage has a unit root.  We will 
address this problem in estimation by adding a one-period lagged dependent variable.      23
Estimation 
First, we would like to show that faster technical progress leads to an increase in the 
sophistication of exports. Column 1 of Table 4 displays province fixed-effect estimates of 
equation 9. The coefficient on the technology variable is highly significant and shows that a one 
percent increase in technical progress leads to a 0.204% increase in the skill intensity of exports.  
The elasticity of export skill intensity with respect to FDI is 0.107. Arable land per capita has a 
significantly negative effect on the dependent variable (-0.54), suggesting that exports from 
Chinese provinces follow comparative advantage. The results from the random effects model, 
shown in column 2, are very similar to those of the fixed effects model, which is confirmed by 
the Hausman test. 
The learning-by-exporting argument holds that productivity in exporting firms can be 
improved over time, either because FDI transfers technology to firms that introduce new export 
products, or because the possibility of selling in export markets stimulates firms to improve their 
own technological capabilities (Westphal 2002). Thus the lagged skill intensity of exports may 
be a determinant of skill intensity in the current stage, which induces a dynamic element into our 
analysis.  We deal with this by implementing an AR(1) specification in the disturbance terms. 
The results using fixed effects and random effects are reported in columns 3 and 4. The AR(1) 
specification makes the results from a random effects model more reliable, so even though the 
Hausman test rejects this model in favor of a fixed effects specification, we discuss the results of 
the random effects model.  In this, the technology, FDI and natural resource variables retain their 
significance at 1% level, and their magnitudes are highly comparable with those obtained in the 
static model.   
Another means to take care of the dynamic effect is to include a lagged dependent 
variable among the right hand side variables, so we have
'
1 it it it i it yy x αβ μ − e = ++ + . 
Unfortunately, in this case, the fixed effects estimator is inconsistent.
xvii  One solution to this 
problem is to combine first differencing with IV, i.e., 
'
1 it it it it yyx αβ − e Δ = Δ +Δ +Δ , using  2 it y −  as 
an instrument for  1 it y − Δ  (Anderson and Hsiao 1981).  A frequently preferred alternative is the 
Arellano-Bond estimator (Wooldridge 2001: 304).  The Arellano-Bond estimates are shown in 
Table 4, column 5, while those for the pooled IV model in first differences are in column 6.  
These estimates differ from the AR(1) results in several ways.  The natural resource variable      24
loses significance, and the technology variable is significant only in the Arellano-Bond 
regression, with a smaller elasticity (0.063).  The FDI variable retains a high level of significance, 
however, and its elasticity increases somewhat, to 0.259 in the Arellano-Bond estimates and 
0.176 in the IV estimates.  
We next turn to inequality, using provincial Gini coefficients, proxies for intra-province 
income inequality, as the dependent variable. What we want to test is whether more skill-
intensity of exports is associated with a higher degree of inequality within province. Table 5 
displays the estimation results.  The first two columns show estimates of Eq. (8.a).  The 
estimated coefficient on export skill intensity is positive as expected. It predicts that a 1% higher 
skilled export share increases the intra-provincial Gini by 0.361%.  When an economy 
concentrates its exports and production on skill-intensive products, growth in demand for skilled 
labor exceeds that for unskilled labor.  The skill stock variable is also positive (0.108).  In the 
inequality regressions we also include the GDP share of government expenditure as a proxy for 
institutional quality.  A high government expenditure share reflects potentially high taxes, which 
can be expected to have a negative impact on household income, especially for the poor.  The 
government spending share has an estimated elasticity of 0.262, indicating that other things equal, 
government expenditure is regressive in its distributional impact.   
We also address dynamics, as in the estimation of the skill-intensity model.  Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 5 show estimates obtained in the AR(1) specification. The results are very similar 
to those in columns 1 and 2.  However, the estimates using first-differencing and Arellano-Bond 
tell a different story. In the first-differenced regression both the human capital and the public 
spending variables lose significance. In the Arellano-Bond estimates, human capital is weakly 
significant with an elasticity of 0.162. But in both cases, the skill intensity of exports remains 
significant, with elasticity values of 0.629 and 0.290 in the first-differenced and Arellano-Bond 
regressions, respectively. 
Our model (and the Chinese reality) is of limited labor mobility in response to changing 
labor demand, and in particular, of greater mobility among skilled workers than among the 
unskilled.  Therefore, as predicted, trade-related changes such as in the skills composition of 
exports could affect both intra-provincial inequality in other regions, and also inter-regional 
inequality.  We now address both of these issues.        25
Does an increase in skilled labor demand in one region raise inequality in others?  In 
Table 6, we re-estimate the inequality model on data subsets for coastal and inland provinces.  
From Proposition 3 we hypothesize that a rise in the skill-intensity of exports in one location will 
draw out relatively more skilled than unskilled workers from other regions, thereby raising the 
wage premium.  To test for these effects we include variables for the average export skill 
intensity of provinces in coastal and inland regions in the inequality regressions for the inland 
and coastal regions, respectively.  These variables are robustly positive in all specifications; 
accordingly we reject the hypothesis of no inter-provincial effects from inter-regional 
productivity changes.  
Finally, we examine inter-regional inequality.  The two dependent variables available for 
this purpose are the average manufacturing wage, a measure of the income level of the average 
worker in each province, and the income share of the lowest 20% of the income distribution in 
each province.  In the first four columns of Table 7 we see that in both specifications, the skill-
intensity of exports in coastal provinces has a negative effect on the average wage in the inland.  
The elasticity (in the Arellano-Bond model) is -0.041, meaning that a 1% increase in export skill 
intensity in coastal provinces leads to a 0.04 percent reduction in the average manufacturing 
wage in inland provinces.  Conversely, higher export skill intensity in the inland has a negative 
impact on the coastal average wage (the elasticity is -0.013).  These results support our 
prediction that rapid technological progress (and therefore higher skill-intensity of exports) in 
one region has a negative effect on average wages in other locations within the same skilled 
labor market. 
Finally, as a proxy for the income of the poor in each province we use disposable income 
per worker of the bottom 20 percent of the wealth distribution.  Columns 5-8 in Table 7 show 
first that higher skill-intensity of exports in coastal areas is associated with lower incomes of the 
poor in inland provinces, and second that higher skill-intensity of inland exports has a negative 
effect on the incomes of the poor in coastal regions.  Thus a one-percent increase in the skill 
intensity of exports from an average coastal province is associated with a 0.56 percent decrease 
in the incomes of the poor in interior provinces.  On the other hand, higher export skill intensity 
in inland provinces lowers the incomes of the poor in coastal areas, with an elasticity of -0.693. 
These results imply a rather elastic response of incomes of the poor to a rise in the sophistication      26
of exports from other regions.  In the presence of restrictions on the interprovincial mobility of 
low-skill workers, growth in one part of the country may actually impose welfare costs on others. 
To summarize, the estimation results confirm our theoretical prediction that technical 
progress shifts export shares towards more skill-intensive goods.  In turn, the shift in export 
shares increases intra-province inequality and the provincial average wage.  These results mean 
that the developing country's technological progress contributes to rising inequality. Also, as our 
model predicts, there are interactions between the dynamic region (the coast) and the lagging 
region (the inland) that may also affect both intra- and inter-province inequality and the income 
of the poor in each region. 
 
5    CONCLUSION 
Many economists now maintain that greater openness to trade is associated with rising wage 
inequality in developing and transitional economies, a view that is sharply at odds with 
Heckscher-Ohlin.  Analysis of this issue is complicated by market imperfections, specifically 
those that inhibit factor mobility and introduce differential rates of technical progress, since these 
are also sources of spatial inequality.  Our theoretical and econometric analyses both show how 
interactions between factor mobility restrictions and different regional rates of technological 
progress can explain the evolution of inequality in response to trade and FDI.  As favored 
regions benefit more from international trade, their growing demand for skills drains skilled 
workers from disadvantaged areas.  In a dynamic sense, the latter regions lag further behind. 
Therefore, average income growth in the favored regions is faster than in less favored regions. 
Moreover, this unbalanced regional growth may also exert downward pressure on the incomes of 
unskilled workers in disadvantaged areas.  In sum, the scarcity of human capital in some regions 
retards regional technological progress, and this—together with a lack of the infrastructure that 
facilitates international trade—keeps economic growth from occurring and slows the rate of 
poverty reduction.   
It is frequently verified that exports are positively correlated with economic growth. 
However, the long-run growth effects of exports of resource-based, or low-skill labor-intensive 
commodities is expected to differ from those of exports of highly sophisticated technology and 
knowledge intensive goods.  Hausmann et al. (2007) show empirically that specialization in      27
higher skill-intensity exports can lead to faster economic growth. They argue that policies which 
foster skills upgrading in exports have a positive effect on economic growth.  In this paper, we 
show that when labor market segmentation exists, high-skill exports may have adverse effects on 
both interregional and intraregional inequality.  Therefore, the aggregate growth effect may be a 
net gain consisting of expansion in one region of the economy that is partially offset by 
contractions in others. 
It is important to keep in mind that actions taken by the government can also contribute to 
rising regional inequality. In order to maximize aggregate growth possibilities, government may 
allocate public investments mainly in rapidly developing regions, an action which further favors 
the already rich region at the expense of poorer areas.  China, in recent years, has begun 
redirecting public investments in both human capital and infrastructure to inland provinces, in a 
belated attempt to equalize rates of output and employment growth and thus to close the 
development gap.  Given the geography of the country, however, these measures are likely to be 
second-best relative to policies that liberalize internal labor migration from inland to coastal 
provinces.       28
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Table 1: Products used in calculating skill-intensity of exports 
Product by Skill Intensity 
Aircraft and spacecraft  
Pharmaceuticals  
Office, accounting and computing machinery  
Radio, TV and communications equipment  
High Skill Intensive Products 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  
  
Other electrical machinery and apparatus  
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  
Chemicals excl. pharmaceuticals  
Railroad equipment and other transport equip.  
Medium-High Skill Intensive Products 
Other machinery and equipment  
  
Coke, refined petroleum product and nuclear fuel  
Rubber and plastics products  
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Building and repairing of ships and boats  
Medium-High Skill Intensive Products 
Basic metals  
  Fabricated metal products, excl. machinery  
   
Other manufacturing and recycling 
Wood, pulp, paper and printed products  
Food products, beverages and tobacco  
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  
Low Skill Intensive Products 
  
Source: UN 2007   
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Table 2:   Summary statistics of key variables 
Variable Unit  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev  Min  Max  Obs 
FDI   % of GDP  7.800 3.070 11.7925 0.326 77.100  275
Public Spending   share of GDP  0.15643 0.14662 0.052557 0.07436 0.49978  339
Skill intensity of exports    0.09319 0.06011 0.089649 0.00439 0.53252  339
Human capital  % of labor force  6.004 5.070 4.7037 0.000 30.940  309
Arable land   ha /person  0.101 0.075 0.0688 0.015 0.321  355
Gini Coefficient    0.225 0.218 0.0375 0.144 0.360  208
Income of the poor  RMB yuan  7522.33 6668.7 2760.10 3775.15 18428.78  207
Manufacturing wage  RMB yuan  9238.49 8364.50 4188.111 3611.00 29743.00  330
Value added per worker  RMB yuan  58426.98 47651.02 38127.44 9864.00 243447.00  271
 
      36
Table 3:  Unit root test 
Variable  Average manufacturing 
wage  Bottom 20% income 
 1*  2**  1*  2** 
Coefficient -0.072  -0.212  -0.581  -0.916 
t-value -2.756  -7.032  -7.681  -9.024 
t-star 0.105  -3.858  -4.180  -5.362 
P-value 0.5419  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 
      
Obs  319 319 203 203 
Groups 29  29  29 29 
* no lag is allowed     
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Table 4:  Estimation results: skill intensity of exports 
Dependent 
variable  Skill Intensity of Exports 
Method       AR(1)  Arellano- First 
  FE RE FE RE  Bond    differencing 
Lagged skill           0.132**  0.889 
intensity of export          (0.0669)  (0.7566) 
           
Technology level  0.204***  0.187***  0.104*  0.192***   0.063*   0.106 
 (0.0442)  (0.0404)  (0.0595) (0.0465) (0.0360)  (0.0798) 
           
FDI 0.107**  0.138***  0.128*  0.144***  0.259***  0.176*** 
 (0.0494)  (0.0452)  (0.0725) (0.0472) (0.0595)  (0.0605) 
           
Arable land   -0.544**  -0.783*** -0.014 -0.780***  0.159  -0.152 
per capita  (0.2772)  (0.1519)  (0.3695) (0.1456) (0.3291)  (0.3533) 
           
Hausman  test           
Chi-square 2.40  28.45     
           
Observations  290 290 261 290  254  254 
Groups  29  29 29 29  29   
Adj  R-square:          0.0459 
within  0.1878 0.1849 0.0381 0.1850     
between  0.6002 0.5969 0.4660 0.5982     
overall  0.5611 0.5636 0.4131 0.5652         
          
Standard error in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 5:  Estimation results: Gini Coefficient (whole sample) 
Dependent 
variable  Gini Coefficient 
Method         AR(1)  First  Arellano- 
  FE RE FE RE  difference  Bond   
Public  spending  0.262*** 0.146** 0.270*** 0.140**    0.166  0.162 
 (0.0772)  (0.0573)  (0.0975)  (0.0567) (0.1319)  (0.1931) 
         
Skill stock  0.108***  0.084***  0.089**  0.080***  0.004  0.097* 
 (0.0339)  (0.0245)  (0.0403)  (0.0243) (0.0398)  (0.0506) 
         
Lagged  Gini       0.378  -0.352*** 
coefficient       (0.0803)  (0.1359) 
         
Skill  intensity  0.361*** 0.057 0.362*** 0.055 0.629*** 0.290* 
 of export  (0.0938)  (0.0353)  (0.1155) (0.0346) (0.1937)  (0.1531) 
         
Hausman  test          
Chi-square  89.93  25.65      
          
Observations  213 213 184 213 153  153 
Groups  29 29 29 29    28 
Adj  R-square:       0.1473   
within 0.3560  0.3298  0.2659  3297     
between  0.0099 0.0417 0.0243 0.0418     
overall  0.0251 0.038 0.0084 0.038         
         
Standard error in brackets        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 6 Estimation results: Gini Coefficient (by region)  
Dependent variable  Gini Coefficient 
Method   FE  FE  FE AR(1)  First differencing  Arellano-Bond 
  Inland   Coast  Inland   Coast  Inland   Coast  Inland   Coast 
Public spending  0.193**  0.062  0.199  0.080  -0.139  -0.741***  0.352  -0.083 
  (0.0893) (0.1347) (0.1257) (0.1404)  (0.1562) (0.1804) (0.2925) (0.2069) 
           
Skill  stock  0.039 0.089* -0.034  0.099***  -0.284  0.075 1.350** 0.208 
  (0.0464) (0.0454) (0.0466) (0.0461)  (0.3301) (0.0673) (0.4437) (0.0991) 
           
Coastal skill   0.504***    0.555***    1.433*    1.682**   
intensity  of  export  (0.1373)  (0.2116)   (0.7332)  (0.7574)  
           
Inland skill     0.767***    0.848***     0.346**     1.016*** 
intensity  of  export   (0.1460)  (0.1572)   (0.1721)  (0.2331) 
           
Lagged Gini          -0.112    0.050  -0.303**  -0.728*** 
coefficient       (0.1216  (0.1245)  (0.1275)  (0.1233) 
           
Skill intensity  -0.040  0.132  0.026  0.238***  0.172  0.467  -0.110  0.486* 
 of export  (0.0315)  (0.1058)  (0.0370)  (0.1156) (0.1914)  (0.5075)  (0.3300)  (0.2638) 
              
Observations  125 88 108 76 90  63  90  63 
Groups  17 12 17 12      16 12 
Adj  R-square:       0.0686  0.2157    
within  0.3363 0.6126 0.1616 0.6060         
between  0.0429 0.0005 0.0418 0.0033         
overall  0.0813  0.1725  0.0207  0.0778             
            
Standard error in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Table 7 Estimation results: wages and poverty 
Dependent Variable  Manufacturing wage  Bottom 20% income  
Method First  differencing  Arellano-Bond First  differencing Arellano-Bond 
  Inland   Coast  Inland   Coast  Inland   Coast  Inland   Coast 
Public spending  -0.014   0.080  -0.008   0.002  -0.385**  0.104  -0.347*  0.203 
 (0.0591)  (0.0634)  (0.0424)  (  0.0455)  (0.1825) (0.2088)  (0.1453)  (0.1440) 
                
Skill stock  0.022  0.587***  0.018*  0.023  -0.120  -0.080  0.022  0.005 
 (0.0185)  (0.1430)  (  0.0107)  (0.0199  )  (0.3401) (0.0764)  (0.0543)  (0.0602) 
                
Coast skill   -0.387**    -0.041**    0.512     -0.559*   
intensity of export  (0.1561)    (0.0191)    (0.6003)    (0.2961)   
                
Inland skill     -0.025*    -0.013*     -0.811***    -0.693*** 
intensity of export    (0.0127)    (0.0067)    (0.1967)    (0.1612) 
               
Lagged   0.548***  0.943***   -0.309***  -0.359***  0.876***  0.895***    0.037  0.291*** 
dependent variable  (0.0917)  (0.1634)  (0.0785)  (0.0959) (0.1047)  (0.0665)  (0.2339) (0.1030) 
               
Skill intensity  0.300***  0.587***  0.042*  0.014*  -0.120  0.451   0.300   0.397*** 
of export  (0.1033)  (0.1430)  (0.0235)  (0.0059) (0.3401)  (0.5757)  (0.2367) (0.1070) 
                
Observations 153  108  153  108  90  63  90  63 
Group     16  12      16  12 
Adjusted R
2 0.7527  0.7691        0.4883  0.7733       
             
Standard error in brackets            
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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NOTES 
                                                 
i Samsung Economic Research Institute, 25/F China Merchants Tower, No.118, Jian Guo Lu, 
Chao Yang District, Beijing, China 100022. Email: muqunli@gmail.com. 
ii University of Wisconsin-Madison, 413 Taylor Hall, 427 Lorch St., Madison, WI 53706.  Email: 
coxhead@wisc.edu.   
iii For simplicity, we ignore trade costs, so there is complete specialization by region. 
iv Development economists often emphasize the growth impact of exports, especially exports of 
high-tech goods. Export sectors, it is argued have higher factor productivity, and their growth 
generates positive externalities for related sectors in the form of knowledge spillovers, process 
and product innovation, technological change, etc.; and that the scope for positive externalities is 
increasing in the technology and skill content of the exported goods (Hausmann et al. 2007; 
Blalock and Gertler 2004; Takii 2004). However, effect of high-tech exports on inequality and 
economic growth in one region on other regions within a developing economy has not been 
thoroughly researched.  
v Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. 
vi Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong. 
vii Otherwise, the cutoff point of exporting good will be different for international and intra-
national trade, which makes our analysis unnecessarily complicated and beyond our main focus. 
viii Coe and Helpman (1995) find that R&D abroad benefits domestic productivity, possibly 
through the transfer of technological know-how via trade. 
ix Welch (1975), Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Benhabib 
and Spiegel (1994), Basu and Weil (1998). 
x For goods produced in Inland, i.e., z￿(0,z1) 
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xii Data for Tibet and Chongqing are not available.      42
                                                                                                                                                             
1 it
xiii For several provinces, we do have wage income, and in most the cases, wage income accounts 
for 70 percent or more of disposable income. 
xiv For example, when Inland has slower technological progress compared to Coast, skilled labor 
chooses to emigrate from Inland, therefore the skill premium increases there. On the other hand, 
this skill outflow results in rich households becoming richer in Inland but there are fewer such 
households left. As a result, we could observe a lower Gini coefficient if there is huge drop in 
skill endowment. However, after reviewing the annual change rate of each province's human 
capital stock, we find that the change in this variable over time was relatively smooth for each 
province, therefore non-monotonicity issues should not greatly affect this dataset. 
xv After 2002, the title became Yearbook of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. 
xvi The manufacturing wage series and that for the bottom 20% of income may have unit roots. 
Export skill intensity and the Gini coefficient lie in the interval [0, 1], so they are automatically 
stationary. 
xvii This is because the sample mean of  y −  is correlated with that of  .  it e